Now that amd-iommu support interrupt remapping, enable the GASup in IVRS
table and GASup in extended feature register to indicate that IOMMU
support guest virtual APIC mode. GASup provides option to guest OS to
make use of 128-bit IRTE.
Note that the GAMSup is set to zero to indicate that amd-iommu does not
support guest virtual APIC mode (aka AVIC) which would be used for the
nested VMs.
See Table 21 from IOMMU spec for interrupt virtualization controls
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Cc: Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Currently, the amdvi_validate_dte() assumes that a valid DTE will
always have V=1. This is not true. The V=1 means that bit[127:1] are
valid. A valid DTE can have IV=1 and V=0 (i.e address translation
disabled and interrupt remapping enabled)
Remove the V=1 check from amdvi_validate_dte(), make the caller
responsible to check for V or IV bits.
This also fixes a bug in existing code that when error is
detected during the translation we'll fail the translation
instead of assuming a passthrough mode.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Cc: Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
A guest boot hangs while probing the network interface when
iommu_platform=on is used.
The following qemu cli hangs without this patch:
# $QEMU \
-netdev tap,fd=3,id=hostnet0,vhost=on,vhostfd=4 3<>/dev/tap67 4<>/dev/host-net \
-device virtio-net-pci,netdev=hostnet0,id=net0,iommu_platform=on,disable-legacy=on \
...
Commit: c471ad0e9b (vhost_net: device IOTLB support) took care of
setting vhostfd to non-blocking when QEMU opens /dev/host-net but if
the fd is passed from qemu cli then we need to ensure that fd is set
to non-blocking.
Fixes: c471ad0e9b ("vhost_net: device IOTLB support")
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
The function can be used to get the current SEV capabilities.
The capabilities include platform diffie-hellman key (pdh) and certificate
chain. The key can be provided to the external entities which wants to
establish a trusted channel between SEV firmware and guest owner.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The command can be used by libvirt to retrieve the measurement of SEV guest.
This measurement is a signature of the memory contents that was encrypted
through the LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA.
Cc: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
During machine creation we encrypted the guest bios image, the
LAUNCH_MEASURE command can be used to retrieve the measurement of
the encrypted memory region. This measurement is a signature of
the memory contents that can be sent to the guest owner as an
attestation that the memory was encrypted correctly by the firmware.
VM management tools like libvirt can query the measurement using
query-sev-launch-measure QMP command.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START command creates a new VM encryption key (VEK).
The encryption key created with the command will be used for encrypting
the bootstrap images (such as guest bios).
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When SEV is enabled, the hardware encryption engine uses a tweak such
that the two identical plaintext at different location will have a
different ciphertexts. So swapping or moving a ciphertexts of two guest
pages will not result in plaintexts being swapped. Hence relocating
a physical backing pages of the SEV guest will require some additional
steps in KVM driver. The KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_{UN,}REG_REGION ioctl can be
used to register/unregister the guest memory region which may contain the
encrypted data. KVM driver will internally handle the relocating physical
backing pages of registered memory regions.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When memory encryption is enabled, KVM_SEV_INIT command is used to
initialize the platform. The command loads the SEV related persistent
data from non-volatile storage and initializes the platform context.
This command should be first issued before invoking any other guest
commands provided by the SEV firmware.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Add a new memory encryption object 'sev-guest'. The object will be used
to create encrypted VMs on AMD EPYC CPU. The object provides the properties
to pass guest owner's public Diffie-hellman key, guest policy and session
information required to create the memory encryption context within the
SEV firmware.
e.g to launch SEV guest
# $QEMU \
-object sev-guest,id=sev0 \
-machine ....,memory-encryption=sev0
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Inorder to integerate the Secure Encryption Virtualization (SEV) support
add few high-level memory encryption APIs which can be used for encrypting
the guest memory region.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Create a documentation entry to describe the AMD Secure Encrypted
Virtualization (SEV) feature.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Add a new base CPU model called 'EPYC' to model processors from AMD EPYC
family (which includes EPYC 76xx,75xx,74xx, 73xx and 72xx).
The following features bits have been added/removed compare to Opteron_G5
Added: monitor, movbe, rdrand, mmxext, ffxsr, rdtscp, cr8legacy, osvw,
fsgsbase, bmi1, avx2, smep, bmi2, rdseed, adx, smap, clfshopt, sha
xsaveopt, xsavec, xgetbv1, arat
Removed: xop, fma4, tbm
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20170815170051.127257-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Singh, Brijesh